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1. Introduction
The conditions of a competitive market are very restrictive and, as such on 
many markets, are not met. The term “market failure” refers to any situation 
where the balance set on free and non-regulated markets (i.e., markets without 
direct control of the government in the cases of price or quantity) does not lead 
to the effective allocation of resources. Unpredictability (i.e., market failure) stands 
for all situations in which interference prevents the ‘invisible hand’ from efﬁcient 
allocation. The examples of these failures are: imperfect competition, economic 
instability, lack of complete information, the existence of public goods, and ex-
ternalities. The energy market is a typical example of market failure in terms of 
negative externalities associated with negative effects on the environment. 
This paper consists of two parts – theoretical and empirical. In the ﬁrst part, 
the authors place a strong emphasis on the economic consequences of market 
failure with respect to externalities – both positive and negative. Moreover, 
positive and negative externalities as well as the decision criteria used in cost-
beneﬁt analysis (a method supporting a decision-making process) have been 
profoundly characterized from a theoretical perspective. In the second part, 
the authors’ describe the mathematical model used for forecasting the long-term 
development of the domestic energy sector. An example reﬂecting the inefﬁciency 
caused by the negative effects produced by the Polish energy sector as well as 
the lack of so-called internalization of external costs have been shown. It should 
be emphasized that the importance of the results are that, unlike other works, 
they demonstrate the development of the sector from a social perspective. It is 
indicated that the type of decision-making criterion is essential to the nature and 
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scope of economic results. It has proven that the results (in aggregated form of 
discounted welfare) may differ signiﬁcantly from the traditional approach, based 
on the minimization of private costs.
2. Positive and negative external effects
The concept of external effect ﬁrst appeared in the work of Marshall in 
1890 (Marshall 1890). However, the most substantial contribution to research 
on external effects was introduced by Pigou in The Economics of Welfare (Pigou 
1932). Based on the theory of welfare, he distinguished the concept of private 
and social beneﬁts as well as private and social costs. He deﬁned externalities 
as the divergences between private and social beneﬁts or costs. In turn, Stiglitz 
believes that the external effect occurs when a person or company takes action 
that has an impact on the situation of other people or companies (who are not 
compensated by corresponding payments).
There are two factors in the literature that characterize the external effects. 
The ﬁrst is the impact of one entity on another in such a way that it chang-
es the utility or production functions of the entity that does not participate in 
the activity that caused the change. The second factor is the lack of penalties 
imposed on the entity that causes the external effects. Following this literature, 
the negative external effect arises when the decision made by an individual 
(in terms of production or consumption) has a direct and negative impact on 
other people’s production or consumption. In other words, it is a situation in 
which the welfare of one entity (a private person or company) is reduced by an-
other entity just due to its existence. In practice, this means a situation in which 
companies produce goods at a reduced price that does not include the total 
social costs of its production. 
The distinction between the concepts of externality and external cost is 
necessary and justiﬁed by the measurability of effects that arise as a result of 
business activities. The external effect takes place in the case of both measurable 
and unmeasurable effects, while external cost is related only to measurable ef-
fects that may be internalized and consequently included in the production costs. 
Some economists believe that, instead of the concept of external cost, the term 
of social cost should be applied (Kapp 1961). According to this approach, social 
costs are those that are borne by another entity than the one that caused them.
Figure 1 and Table 1 present the economic consequences of such a situation 
for a competitive market. If there are negative externalities, marginal social cost 
(MSC) is higher than the private cost of production (MPC) at about the size of 
external costs (MEC). If companies do not include external costs in their cost 
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calculations, the market supply function includes only private costs (MPC). Mar-
ket equilibrium is achieved at the price of P1 and the production volume of Q1. 
However, if a company paid for the negative effects, the equilibrium point would 
be different – P* and Q*. Consequently, the existence of negative externalities 
causes an overproduction of Q1 – Q*. 
Figure 1. Negative externalities
Table 1
Negative externalities – economic consequences 
Characteristics
Market  
equilibrium
Social optimum
The difference  
between social  
optimum and  
market equilibrium
Consumers surplus A + B + G + K A – B – G – K
Producers surplus
E + F + R + H 
+ N
B + E + F + R + 
H + G
B + G – N
External cost
R + H + N + G + 
K + M
R + H + G M + N + K
Net social welfare
A + B + E + F 
– M
A + B + E + F M
Social loss M zero M
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The economic consequences for producers (producer surplus), consumer 
(consumer surplus), and the environment (external costs) of both situations are 
presented in Table 1. Net social welfare is the sum of consumer and producer 
surpluses minus external costs. If the volume of production is Q*, and the prod-
uct is sold at a market price P*, net social welfare would increase by ﬁeld M. Of 
course, it creates serious distribution effects. Consumers would suffer losses in 
the sum of ﬁelds B, G, K, whereas the situation of producers would improve by 
the total of ﬁelds B + G – N. Environmental costs would decrease by the sum of 
ﬁelds M + N + K.
In the case of positive externalities, marginal social beneﬁts of the supply of 
a goods exceed marginal private beneﬁts. This means that, in this case, a com-
pany produces too little as a result of not considering external beneﬁts. Naturally, 
when a consumer purchases a product, only individual beneﬁts are considered 
regardless of the beneﬁts to others. Good examples of positive externalities are 
education, health, and research.
Figure 2 and Table 2 present the economic consequences of the positive 
externalities. Market demand is represented by curve MPB. It is the sum of 
the individual beneﬁts enjoyed by consumers who purchase a particular good. 
The supply curve represents MPC producers who deliver a good at different 
marginal costs. 
Figure 2. Positive externalities 
The market is in equilibrium at the price of P1 and the volume of production 
of Q1. In this situation, a consumer surplus is the area below the demand curve 
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MBP and above the price of P1 and equals PS = B + E + F. However, there are 
positive externalities associated with goods consumption that corresponds to 
the MEB curve. Thus, the marginal social beneﬁt exceeds the marginal private 
beneﬁt: MSB = MPB+MEB. Consequently, in the market equilibrium at the price of 
P1 and the volume of production of Q1, the amount of the external beneﬁt equals:
 EB = A + H + J
At the equilibrium point, social beneﬁts are the sum of private beneﬁts for 
consumers (consumer surplus), producer surplus, and positive externalities:
 NSP = A + B + E + F + G + H + J + R
However, from a social perspective, it is not the optimal level of production. In 
this point, the marginal cost of producing the last unit of a good is P1 that is lower 
than the marginal social beneﬁt derived from the production of this good. Therefore, 
from a social point of view, it is proﬁtable to increase the production to the level 
of Q*, where marginal social beneﬁt equals the marginal cost of producing the last 
unit of a good. At this level of production, the social welfare may be improved by 
M + N. In order to provide a socially-optimal production level, it is necessary to 
introduce subsidies for producers (which are similar to a negative tax) in the amount 
of Ps – P* (which will motivate producers to deliver optimum output). The economic 
consequences for producers, consumers, the government (in the case of interven-
tion), and individuals who achieve positive externalities are presented in the Table 2.
Table 2
Positive externalities – economic consequences
Characteristics
Market  
equilibrium 
(without  
subsidy)
Social optimum 
(subsidy)
The difference  
between social  
optimum and market 
equilibrium
Consumers surplus B + E + F
B + E + F + G + 
K + L
G + K + L
Producers surplus G + R F + G + R + J + M F + J + M 
External beneﬁt A + H + J
A + H + J + M + 
N + T
M + N + T
Government cost – 
subsidies
zero
F + G + J + K + L 
+ M + T
F + G + J + K + L + 
M + T
Net social welfare
A + B + E + 
F + G + H + 
J + R
A + B + E + F + 
G + H + J + M + 
N + R
M + N
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3. Decision rules in the cost-benefit analysis
The cost-beneﬁt analysis is a method that is used in the case of choosing when 
and how a government should react in the private market in order to change 
consumer and producer behavior. The purpose of governmental intervention is 
to achieve a situation in which the marginal cost will equal the marginal beneﬁts 
of this intervention. In the case of negative externalities, such an intervention 
often takes the form of a tax on producers, whereas in the case of positive exter-
nalities – the subsidy.
The cost-beneﬁt analysis uses two decision rules:
1) beneﬁts – costs > 0 (or, alternatively, beneﬁt/ cost > 1),
2) maximizing net beneﬁts (beneﬁts – costs).
The ﬁrst rule refers to the situation where a decision to implement a project 
(which has no alternative) must be chosen or rejected. When the total beneﬁts 
of its implementation outweigh total costs, then it should be introduced. Such 
a situation rarely occurs, since there are almost always various projects which dif-
fer in type and scale. In this case, we have to reject, adopt one or several projects 
or implement of any at the appropriate level. What is important, the marginal 
costs and beneﬁts differ depending on the scale of the project. Therefore, it 
would be a mistake to only compare the total costs and beneﬁts without taking 
into account the marginal values. Therefore, it means that only the second rule 
guarantees the right decision to be made, where the marginal beneﬁts exceed 
the marginal costs. This can be illustrated on Figure 3, where the horizontal axis 
presents the quantity of goods supplied to the market (it can also be interpreted 
as the projects or investments ranked in terms of cost).
Net beneﬁts are maximized when the volume of goods at Q1 is delivered. 
At this point, the marginal beneﬁt equals the marginal cost; therefore, the total 
beneﬁts exceed the total costs of the highest value. At this point, the net beneﬁt 
equals A (total beneﬁts are A + C and total cost is C), which is more than in 
the volume of goods at Q2 where net beneﬁt is A – B (A + C + D – C – D – B).
What volume of production follows the condition that net beneﬁt = 0? In 
the ﬁgure, it happens at the volume of Q2. This means that the average beneﬁts equal 
the average costs, the total beneﬁts equal the total costs, and the beneﬁt/cost = 1. 
Hence, the application of beneﬁt/cost > 1 or beneﬁts – costs > 0 decision-making 
rule leads to bad choices. From a microeconomic perspective, it means that 
achieving the breakeven point by the company (Q2) is not economically correct. 
Only the ﬁrst criterion ensures an efﬁcient decision. 
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Figure 3. Decision rules
It is crucial that the decision criterion described above can be interpreted 
differently depending on the type of organization. For private companies, private 
costs and beneﬁts matter the most. In such a case, the decision process is based 
on the analysis of production costs and income gained from a business activity. If 
the discounted proﬁts are greater than zero, then the project is accepted. In this 
case, the potential externalities (costs or beneﬁts) of its activities do not count. 
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It is totally different in the case of a public institution. Here, not only private 
costs and beneﬁts should be taken into account, but also social costs and beneﬁts 
of the decision. It can, therefore, be assumed that the public decision-making 
process is based on the principle of maximizing the difference between the sum 
of beneﬁts and costs, both private and social. Because the volume of external costs 
is, in many cases, difﬁcult to estimate, a decision criterion is often based only on 
minimizing costs. In this particular case, we are dealing with the cost-effectiveness 
analysis, where the beneﬁts are clearly deﬁned (e.g., a socially-acceptable level of 
emissions, satisfactory level of production), whereas the costs of the projects are 
variable. It is necessary to emphasize that the cost-effectiveness analysis does not 
guarantee that a particular project, program, or policy is socially desirable. The main 
advantage of this approach is that we have the possibility of comparing different 
projects and selecting the most suitable for achieving previously-deﬁned goals. 
Then, the project is selected which has the highest ratio of effects to expenditures 
or the lowest expenditures to effects ratio, whereas the “effects” in both cases are 
the same. A cost-effectiveness analysis of a project does not give a true answer to 
the question of whether the expenditure (associated with its implementation) is 
justiﬁed in the social sense. However, when the decision whether to implement 
a project has been taken, then this method is useful and provides the best option. 
4. Implications for the Polish energy sector
The theoretical consequences of market failure presented above are reﬂected in 
the empirical example of the development of the Polish energy sector. The results 
are based on the authors’ research on the long-run development of the domestic 
energy sector. The method of partial equilibrium analysis was used in this research, 
where mathematical notation and results are presented in other publications by 
the author(s) (Kudełko 2006, Kudełko 2008, Kudełko et al. 2011).
Different types of energy models have been developed for addressing various 
policy and planning concerns. The so-called “bottom-up” modeling approach is 
focused mainly on micro-level technological issues and does not capture important 
macroeconomic inter-links within the economy. These models are mainly concen-
trated on least-cost energy planning with reference to environmental constraints. 
They are limited for policy goals since they do not analyze the effects of price changes 
on other markets. Examples of this type of approach are MARKAL (Berger 1987), 
EFOM (Finon 1974), LEAP (Raskin 1986), and AIM (Morita et al. 1996). 
In contrast to this type of model, the tool used here is the dynamic partial 
equilibrium model of the mid-term development of the Polish power sector. 
The model focuses on detailed issues related to energy production capabilities 
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(electricity and heating markets) without capturing other macroeconomic links. 
It equilibrates prices and volumes of electricity and heat production, taking into 
account external costs related to emissions generated by energy technologies. 
The demand for ﬁnal energy is estimated on the basis of market relations; i.e., 
price and income elasticity. In this representation, the buyer of energy consumes 
electricity and heat up to the point where his marginal willingness to pay equals 
the marginal cost of production. Hence, consumers maximize their discounted 
surpluses, and producer behavior is modeled as a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm in 
the energy market. The markets will be in equilibrium if the activities of differ-
ent “agents” are compatible. This means that the total demand for electricity and 
heat equals their supplies.
The basis for construction of the models is interactions between the supply 
and demand sides of the economy system (Fig. 4). The supply side considers pos-
sibilities of delivering fuel from domestic or foreign sources and their conversion 
through the energy processes. Public power plants, public CHP plants, industry 
CHP plants, and municipal heating plants are the main producers of energy in 
Poland. The variables representing these technologies include electricity and 
heat production and a level of technological and environmental investments. 
The demand side is represented by the main energy consumers; i.e., industry 
and construction, transport, agriculture, trade and services, individual consum-
ers, and exports. The demand curves were estimated by appropriate price and 
income elasticity coefﬁcients. 
Figure 4. Structure of the model
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The results could be analyzed in the light of the two main criteria that formu-
late the condition of the effective allocation of resources and main scenarios of 
the model. The ﬁrst criterion assumes a cost-effective allocation. The second criterion 
is based on the maximization of social welfare that is deﬁned as a sum of producer 
and consumer surplus. From the social point of view, a crucial issue is the external 
cost caused by emission of the main air pollutants produced by the energy sector. 
The model has been scaled, and its results reﬂect the actual performance of the Polish 
energy sector. External costs were based on the ExternE estimations (NEEDS 2009). 
Therefore, the scenarios reﬂect the scope of external cost internalization – from 
its lack to its full internalization (Table 3, Option 2, Scenarios 1 and 2). Moreover, 
how the optimization criterion (i.e., minimizing costs (Option 1) and maximizing 
welfare (Option 2)) affected the cost of the sector was also studied. 
Table 3 shows the results of the model calculation in respect to aggregate energy 
sector economic parameters in 2010–2025. In order to estimate the level of social 
costs and beneﬁts, changes in consumer and producer surpluses were calculated. 
Consumer surplus measures the difference between how much the consumer is 
willing to pay and how much the price of the product is. Producer surplus measures 
the difference between the price that the producer receives from a supplier and 
the price that would be able to accept when minimizing the size of the production. 
Direct costs include operation costs of existing power plants as well as investment 
costs of building new ones. Private welfare is the sum of producer and consumer sur-
pluses, whereas social welfare is the difference between private welfare and external 
costs resulting from the emission of pollutants from various energy technologies*.
Table 3
Welfare for different options of the Polish energy sector development, mln zl
Option 1
Option 2
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Discounted consumer sur plus – 547337 442142
Discounted producers surplus – 108658 133676
Discounted direct costs 358520 311078 325171
Discounted external costs, including: 265113 285481 114282
 Private welfare – 655995 575818
 Social welfare – 375396 466418
Source: own calculations
 * More on external costs estimations for domestic energy sector in Kudełko 2007, Kudełko 2009.
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The reference is Scenario 1, where the objective function does not contain 
external costs. Focusing only on private production costs leads to overproduc-
tion of electricity and heat. This high level of production does not give the best 
result, as the producer surplus is lower than in Scenario 2 and equals 109 mld zl. 
Nevertheless, the situation for consumers is best, and the estimated surplus 
reaches a value of about 547 mld zl. As a result, the value of private welfare is 
the greatest and is about 656 mld zl. 
However, the maximizing private welfare criterion is not socially optimal since 
a high level of production and its structure (energy mix) causes the highest level 
of external costs, estimated at around 285 mld zl. As a result, the level of social 
welfare is about 375 mld zl. The internalization of external costs into the objective 
function signiﬁcantly increases the level of social welfare. The amount of external 
costs incurred by society decreases by about 60%. A reduction of electricity and 
heat production is the main reason for such a signiﬁcant decrease of external costs, 
but it also causes a negative effect in the form of reduced private welfare (by 12% 
when compared to Scenario 1). Even though the economic situation of energy 
producers is improving due to the fact that demand guarantees higher energy 
prices and an increase in income, the situation is unfavorable for consumers. As 
a result, social welfare is increased by about 24% when compared to Scenario 1. 
It proves that the internalization of external costs is economically justiﬁed. 
An important question requiring some comments is the result of the scenario 
that minimizes private costs. Table 3 shows total costs of domestic energy-sector 
development in traditional terms of private cost minimizing (Option 1). This 
criterion is used in most models in which the goal is to ﬁnd the right direction 
of energy systems development for different economic conditions, fuel potential 
and prices, environmental regulations, investment burdens, etc. (e.g., models 
MARKAL, EFOM, IPM). This approach is popular due to programming limitations 
for linear-programming solvers. Looking at this solution and comparing it with 
the results given for the differently-formulated objective function (Option 2), we 
can formulate the critical assessment of the development of the energy system 
based only on the cost-effectiveness approach (as long as we keep the technical 
and economic assumptions the same). In Option 2, demand for energy is variable 
in contrast to Option 1, where demand for energy is an exogenous parameter. 
Thus, in those situations where consumer response is a crucial issue (what is in 
fact in Option 2), the cost-effectiveness rule can give distorted results. Demand 
reactions depend primarily on price elasticity; in this research, it is in the range 
from –0.20 to –0.25 according to the demand sector. As a result, Option 1 is 
about 15% more expensive than the others in terms of direct costs, mainly due 
to higher electricity and heat production. The structure of energy production 
is comparable. 
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5. Conclusions
Cost and beneﬁt analysis is still the subject of intense debate relating to 
appropriate categorization and valuation of these terms. In the case of social 
beneﬁts, the vaguest problems appear with identiﬁcation, methods of estima-
tion, and valuation. Both national and foreign literature clearly indicates a seri-
ous controversy in one proper deﬁnition of these terms (projects ExternE 2005, 
NEEDS 2009, NEWEXT 2004, Strupczewski et al. 2006). Because this issue is one 
of the scientiﬁc priorities implemented in developed countries, it is hoped that 
both research and studies will be more reliable in the future. A separate issue 
is the possibility of its wider use. Due to the very speciﬁc and usually unique 
nature of the research, the results do not always match with the characteristics 
of other countries. Similar problems are associated with the valuation of social 
costs. Disputes include the same issues as in the case of social beneﬁts; that is, its 
identiﬁcation and valorization. In economic analyses, some of the components of 
social costs (such as indirect costs) are often omitted; then, the research efforts 
are focused mainly on the estimation of direct costs. One of the reasons for this is 
the fact that a full account of social costs requires the use of appropriate method-
ology, usually underdeveloped. Hence, the published results of costs and beneﬁts 
analysis of effective and efﬁcient economic policies are totally different from one 
another. It specially applies to the type and scope of the economic intervention 
in the energy markets. An example of this may be climate policy, where despite 
international attempts, no agreement has been reached as of yet. 
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